The following is a short extract from Herman Dooyeweerd's book:
“Roots of Western Culture: Pagan, Secular, and Christian Options” (pdf file 11 meg).
Gheibhear íoslódáil (an asgaidh) dhen leabhar air fad aig:
The entire book can be downloaded (for free) at:
http://www.reformationalpublishingproject.com/rpp/search_books.asp
Nature-Grace (Ockam, Luther, Melanchthon, Barth, Brunner)
William of Ockham: Herald of a New Age
During the latter part of the Middle Ages (the fourteenth century), when the dominant position of the church in culture began to erode on all sides, a movement arose within scholasticism that broke radically with the ecclesiastical synthesis. This turn of events announced the beginning of the "modern period." The leader of this movement was the British Franciscan William of Ockham [c. 1280-13491. Ockham, a brilliant monk, mercilessly laid bare the inner dualism of the roman catholic ground motive, denying that any point of contact existed between the realm of nature and the realm of grace. He was keenly aware that the Greek view of nature flagrantly contradicted the scriptural motive of creation. Thomas Aquinas had maintained that the natural ordinances were grounded in divine "reason." For him they were eternal "forms" in the mind of God, in accordance with which God had shaped "matter." Ockham, however, rejected this entire position. Intuitively he knew that Thomas's essentially Greek picture could not be reconciled with the confession of a sovereign creator. However, in order to break with the Greek deification of reason he ended up in another extreme. He interpreted the will of the divine creator as despotic arbitrariness, or potestas absoluta (absolute, free power).
In Greek fashion Thomas had identified the decalogue with a natural, moral law rooted immutably in the rational nature of man and in divine reason. For this reason Thomas held that the decalogue could be known apart from revelation by means of the natural light of reason. But for Ockham, the decalogue did not have a rational basis. It was the gift of an arbitrary God, a God who was bound to nothing. God could easily have ordered the opposite. Ockham believed that the Christian must obey the laws of God for the simple reason that God established these laws and not others. The Christian could not "calculate" God's sovereign will, for the law was merely the result of God's unlimited arbitrariness. In the realm of "nature" the Christian must blindly obey; in the realm of the supranatural truths of grace he must, without question, accept the dogma of the church.
Ockham abandoned every thought of a "natural preparation" for ecclesiastical faith through "natural knowledge." Likewise, he rejected the idea that the church is competent to give supranatural guidance in natural life. He did not acknowledge, for instance, that science is subordinate to ecclesiastical belief. Neither did he believe that the temporal authorities are subordinate to the pope with respect to the explication of natural morality. In principle he rejected the roman catholic view of a "christian society"; standing entirely independent of the church, secular government in his view was indeed "sovereign."
In short, we may say that Ockham deprived the law of its intrinsic value. Founded in an incalculable, arbitrary God who is bound to nothing, the law only held for the sinful realm of nature. For Ockham, man is never certain that God's will would not change under different circumstances. Radically denying that any point of contact between nature and grace existed, he rejected the official roman catholic view of human society, together with its subordination of the natural to the supranatural and of the state to the church.
The attempts of Pope John xxii to stifle the spiritual movement led by Ockham were in vain. The Pope's position was very weak; having been forced to flee from Rome, he depended greatly on the king of France during his exile at Avignon. But above all, a new period in history announced itself at this time — a period that signified the end of medieval, ecclesiastical culture. Ockham's critique convinced many that the roman catholic synthesis between the Greek view of nature and the christian religion had been permanently destroyed. The future presented only two options: one could either return to the scriptural ground motive of the christian religion or, in line with the new motive of nature severed from the faith of the church, establish a modern view of life concentrated on the religion of human personality. The first path led to the Reformation; the second path led to modern humanism. In both movements aftereffects of the roman catholic motive of nature and grace continued to be felt for a long time.
In order to gain a proper insight into the spiritual situation of contemporary Protestantism, it is extremely important to trace the after effects of the roman catholic ground motive. In doing this, we will focus our attention especially on the various conceptions concerning the relation between "church" and "world" in protestant circles. We will be especially interested in "Barthianism," so widely influential today. And, with respect to our overriding theme, we must take note of the resistance against the "antithesis" in the natural realm of science, politics, and social action. This we will attempt to do in the following subsections.
Law and Gospel in Luther
The religious ground motive of nature and grace held the christian mind in a polar tension. Near the end of the Middle Ages this tension ultimately led to Ockham's complete separation of natural life from the Christian life of grace. Practically speaking, the school of Ockham drove a wedge between creation and redemption in Jesus Christ. This had happened earlier, in the first centuries of the christian church, when the Greek and near-eastern dualistic ground motives began to influence the christian motive. One could detect this not only in gnosticism but also in Marcion [second century A.D.] as well as in the Greek church fathers. Although understood in the Greek sense, "natural life" within the framework of nature and grace did refer to God's work of creation. The creation ordinances thus belonged to the realm of nature. As we saw above, Ockham deprived these ordinances of their intrinsic worth. For him the law proceeded from a divine arbitrariness that could change its demands at any moment.
Luther [1483-1546], the great reformer, had been educated in Ockham's circle during his stay at the Erfurt monastery. He himself declared: "I am of Ockham's school." Under Ockham's influence the religious ground motive of nature and grace permeated Luther's life and thought, although certainly not in the roman catholic sense. The Church of Rome rejected a division of nature and grace, considering the former a lower portal to the latter. Luther, however, was influenced by Ockham's dualism which established a deep rift between natural life and the supranatural christian life. In Luther's case this conflict expressed itself as the opposition between law and gospel.
To understand this polarity in Luther's thought, which today plays a central role in Karl Barth and his followers, we must note that Luther returned to a confession which had been rejected by Roman Catholicism: the confession of the radicality of the fall. But within the naturegrace ground motive, Luther could not do justice to this truly scriptural teaching. The moment it became embedded in an internally split religious framework, it could not do justice to the meaning of creation. In Luther's thought this shortcoming manifested itself in his view of the law. He depreciated law as the order for "sinful nature" and thus began to view "law" in terms of a religious antithesis to "evangelical grace." It might seem that this contrast is identical with the contrast made by the apostle Paul in his teaching on the relation of law to grace in Jesus Christ. Paul expressly proclaimed that man is justified by faith alone, not by the works of the law. Actually, however, Paul's statements do not harmonize in the least with Luther's opposition between law and gospel. Paul always calls God's law holy and good. But he wants to emphasize strongly that fallen man cannot fulfil the law and thus can live only by the grace of God.
Ockham's influence, Luther robbed the law as the creational ordinance of its value. For him the law was harsh and rigid and as such in inner contradiction to the love commandment of the gospel. He maintained that the Christian, in his life of love that flows from grace, has nothing to do with the demands of the law. The Christian stood above the law. However, as long as the Christian still existed in this "vale of tears" he was required to adjust himself to the rigid frame of law, seeking to soften it by permeating it as much as possible with christian love in his relation to his fellowman.
However, the antagonism between law and gospel remains in this line of thought. It is true that Luther spoke of the law as the "taskmaster of Christ" and that he thus granted it some value, but in truly christian life the law remained the counterforce to christian love. It needed to be broken from within. For Luther the Christian was free not only from the judgment of the law, which sin brought upon us; in the life of grace the Christian was free from the law itself. He stands entirely above the law. This view of law was certainly not scriptural. In Luther's thought the scriptural creation motive recedes behind the motive of fall and redemption. This led to serious consequences. Luther did not acknowledge a single link between nature, taken with its lawful ordinances, and the grace of the gospel. Nature, which was "radically depraved," had to make way for grace. Redemption signified the death of nature rather than its fundamental rebirth. From the perspective of Roman Catholicism Luther allowed grace to "swallow up" nature.
But because of his dualism, Luther could not conclude that the Christian ought to flee from the world. He believed that it was God's will that Christians subject themselves to the ordinances of earthly life. Christians had to serve God also in their worldly calling and office. No one opposed monastic life more vehemently than Luther. Still, nowhere in Luther do we find an intrinsic point of contact between the christian religion and earthly life. Both stood within an acute dialectical tension between the realm of evangelical freedom and the realm of the law. Luther even contrasted God's will as the creator, who places man amidst the natural ordinances, and God's will as the redeemer, who frees man from the law. His view of temporal reality was not intrinsically reformed by the scriptural ground motive of the christian religion. When in our day Karl Barth denies every point of contact between nature and grace, we face the impact of Luther's opposition between law and gospel.
Birth of Protestant Scholasticism
Luther's view of temporal life was not informed by the spiritual dynamic of the scriptural ground motive. He too remained within the scholastic tradition by considering reason [Vernunft] the sole guide in the realm of nature. Unlike Roman Catholicism, however, he did not acknowledge a connection between natural reason and the revelation of God's Word. "The whore reason" [Die Hure Vernunft] had to capitulate whenever one desired to understand the voice of the gospel. With respect to the truths of faith reason was hopelessly blind. But in matters of secular government, justice, and social order man possessed only the light of reason. It was Ockham's rigorous dualism that sustained Luther's separation of natural reason and the christian religion.
Clearly, in principle Luther had not severed himself from the dualistic ground motive. For example, the great reformer expressed no more interest in "profane science" than his scholastic tutor Ockham. Although he fumed against Aristotle and pagan philosophy in general, he did not point the way toward an inner reformation of thought. From his dualistic starting point he did not see that human thinking arises from the religious root of life and that it is therefore always controlled by a religious ground motive. Similarly, even his new insight into our calling in the world was infected by the dualistic ground motive. To be sure, his idea that every profession rests upon a divine calling was thoroughly in line with the biblical thrust of the Reformation. And Luther certainly broke with the roman catholic view that monastic life had a higher value than worldly life. However, for Luther worldly life belonged exclusively to the realm of "law" and stood in an inner tension with the gospel of love.
But nowhere was the nature-grace dualism expressed more clearly than in Luther's view of the church. Luther was relatively indifferent to the temporal organization of the church, believing that wherever the Word and the sacrament were found the church was present. He did not grant the church its own exclusive, internal legal sphere of competence. He did not, for instance, see an inner connection between the typical qualification of the institutional church as a community of faith and its inherently ecclesiastical legal order. Guided by "natural reason," justice and order were "worldly matters." Justice belonged to the sphere of the law, to "sinful nature." Only proclamation of the Word and the administration of the sacraments belonged to the realm of grace. Thus it was relatively easy for Luther to leave the juridical organization of the church to the worldly magistrates even if this delegation of authority were only "of necessity." Ever since Luther's day the "state church" has been a typical characteristic of lutheran countries.
The peculiar dialectic of the nature-grace ground motive led Luther's learned friend and coworker Melanchthon [1497-1560] to attempt a new synthesis between the christian religion and the spirit of Greek culture. Melanchthon became the father of protestant scholasticism which even today opposes the truly biblical approach in scientific thought with the unbending resistance of an age-old tradition.
Unlike Luther, Melanchthon was trained in the literary humanism of his time. He had a great love for classical, Greco-Roman antiquity. Because of his efforts to "adapt" Greco-Roman thought to the lutheran articles of faith, the form-matter motive of Greek philosophy soon dominated the protestant view of nature. Since Luther was basically indifferent to philosophy the Greek ground motive had temporarily lost its prominence; with Melanchthon, however, it regained its claim on the view of temporal life and on the view of the relation between soul and body. Thus the inherent dialectic of the unscriptural nature-grace ground motive also infiltrated the protestant mind. However, there was no pope who could maintain the new synthesis by means of official verdicts and decrees. And soon the unscriptural nature motive was filled with the new religious content of modern humanism, secularizing and absorbing the motive of grace.
Dialectical Theology
It is against the background of the development of the nature-grace ground motive in the protestant world of thought that the so-called dialectical theology of Karl Barth [1886-1968] and his initial coworkers (Emil Brunner, Gogarten, and others) must be understood. Dialectical theology sharply opposes the religious antithesis in the area of worldly life, rejecting the idea of christian politics, of a christian political party, of a christian labour organization, and of christian scholarship. This new theological movement arose in Switzerland shortly after the first world war. Its adherents forsook the modern humanism that had penetrated German and Swiss theology, having experienced the shocking inner decay of this humanism between the two wars. In harmony with the sixteenth-century reformers, dialectical theology seeks to press the incommensurable daim of God's Word against the arrogance of humanism. It is antihumanistic in the full sense of the word. Nevertheless, dialectical theology sustains itself on the dialectical, unscriptural ground motive of nature and grace. Moreover, the spiritual force of the humanistic ground motive is clearly at work in the view of nature defended by Barth and his immediate followers. They understand nature not in the scholastic-aristotelian sense but in the modern humanistic sense. Prior to 1933, when national socialism came to power in Germany, Barth and his school advocated a radical dualism between nature and grace. Like Luther, they identified nature (conceived humanistically) with sin. They separated nature absolutely from the Word of God, which they understood as the "wholly Other" [ganz Anderet]. Their fundamental depredation of nature testified to the antihumanistic tendency of this theology. Casting the scriptural creation motive aside, they could not even hint at "points of contact" between nature and grace. However, they left the inner dialectic of this dualistic ground motive unchecked, and deep divisions soon arose within the circle of dialectical theology.
Briefly, let us consider the historical context behind the development of dialectical theology. In the preceding chapters we have discussed at some length three of the four religious ground motives that have dominated the development of western culture: the Greek motive of form and matter; the christian motive of creation, fall, and redemption through Jesus Christ; and finally the roman catholic motive of nature and grace. We saw that these ground motives are the hidden, central forces that have lent a sustained direction to the historical development of the West up to this day. As genuinely religious community motives, they have controlled the life and thought of western man in all areas of life, including those of state and society.
We saw that the roman catholic motive of nature and grace had apparently bridged the radical antithesis and the irreconcilable contrast between the pagan ground motive of Greek culture and the ground motive of the christian religion. Roman Catholicism conceived of nature in the Greek sense; nature was a cosmos composed of formless, changing matter and of a form that determined the immutable essence of things. Human nature also was viewed as a composition of form and matter; man's "matter" was the mortal, material body (subject to the stream of becoming and decay), and his "form" was the imperishable, immortal, rational soul, which was characterized by the activity of thought. For Roman Catholicism a supranatural sphere of grace, which was centred in the institutional church, stood above this sphere of nature. Nature formed the independent basis and prelude to grace. Catholicism "adapted" the church's teaching on creation to the Greek view of nature, which itself was shaped in terms of the pagan religious ground motive of form and matter. When we exposed the true religious meaning of the Greek ground motive we demonstrated that this "adaptation" and "reconciliation" were only apparent.
We began by establishing that the form-matter motive originated in an irreconcilable conflict within Greek religious consciousness between the older religions of life and the newer culture religion of the Olympian world. The former rested on a deification of the "stream of life," the stream that arose from "mother earth." Although the life stream was without shape or form, whatever possessed individual form and figure arose from it and was subject to decay. Death was the consequence of fate, the blind and cruel Anangke or Moira. The life stream itself was eternal. Unceasingly it created new forms from the dead, forms that in turn had to make room for others.
By contrast, the later religion of culture was based on a deification of Greek cultural forms. The new Olympian gods were not formless; they took on personal form and figure. Leaving mother earth, they were enthroned on Mount Olympus, the home of the gods. They stood far removed from the eternally flowing stream of becoming and decay. They were immortal; their form and shape stood above this earth and, although they were invisible to the eye of sense, they were full of light and glory. But the Olympian gods were only deified cultural forces. They had no power over Anangke, the blind fate of death. Anangke remained the self-determining antagonist of the deities of culture. The culture religion, therefore, was able to gain official status only in the Greek city-state; in private life the Greeks remained faithful to the old religion of life with its focus on the problems of life and death. Harbouring the profound conflict between these two religions, the religious ground motive of form and matter was thoroughly dualistic. It was utterly incompatible with the creation motive of the Word of God, in which God reveals himself as the absolute origin and creator of all things.
The roman catholic attempt to bridge the Greek and christian ground motives created a new religious dualism. The Greek conception of nature and the christian teaching of grace were placed over against each other in dialectical tension. Only papal authority could preserve the artificial synthesis between these inherently antagonistic ground motives. The Reformation limited this papal authority. Thus, to the extent that the ground motive of nature and grace permeated the Reformation movement, its inner dialectic could unfold itself freely. Hence in the debates concerning the relation between nature and grace within Protestantism, we note the rise of theological trends which denied any point of contact between "natural life" and divine grace in Jesus Christ. In recent years this tension has grown more extreme in the dialectical theology of Karl Barth who, in his debates with his former ally Emil Brunner [1889-1966], explicitly rejected every point of contact between the christian faith and natural life. It is said that Barth repudiated the idea of christian culture. Many feel that Barth, having absolutely separated nature and grace, mortally wounded the roman catholic synthesis. In truth, however, dialectical theology in its religious ground motive remained closely related to Roman Catholicism. Historically speaking, one might say that the Roman Catholic Church had taken revenge on the Reformation by way of the continued impact of its dialectical ground motive within Protestantism. For this motive had a "unifying" effect only as long as the roman catholic idea of the church, with its central papal authority, was accepted. With the rejection of the papacy, the artificial synthesis could not remain intact because of the tension within the ground motive. The Reformation split apart into a disconnected diversity of directions, each identifiable by its particular view of the relation of "nature" and "grace." It was not the scriptural ground motive of creation, fall, and redemption that led to this division within the Reformation but the continual influence of the dialectical ground motive of Roman Catholicism.
Dialectical theology had of course severed itself from the Greek and scholastic conception of nature. Having undergone humanism, it incorporated the new humanistic view of nature in its dialectical tension with the humanistic view of freedom. Here the difference also becomes apparent. Whereas the Roman Catholic Church accepted the Greek view of nature in a positive sense by attempting a reconciliation with the christian creation motive, Barth allowed the creation motive to recede from sight, sacrificing it to the motives of fall and redemption in Jesus Christ. The great master of dialectical theology had no use at all for creation ordinances that might serve as guidelines in our "natural life." According to Barth the fall corrupted "nature" so thoroughly that the knowledge of the creation ordinances was completely lost.
Brunner was of a different mind on this point. He believed that the creation ordinances were valid as expressions of "common grace." At the same time, however, he depreciated these ordinances by placing them in a dialectical polarity with the divine love commandment which he understood as the "demand of the hour" [Gebot der Stunde]. Because of their general character, the creation ordinances are cold and loveless. They form the realm of the law which stands in dialectical opposition to the freedom of the gospel in Jesus Christ who was free from the law. In Brunner too one clearly sees the continuation of the lutheran contrast between law and gospel. This contrast is merely a different expression of the dialectical opposition between nature and grace which in this form — gospel vs. law — had made its first appearance already in latemedieval scholasticism.
For Brunner the law, the cold and rigid framework in which God confines sinful "nature," must really be broken through by the evangelical commandment of love. This commandment knows no general rule and is valid only in and for the moment. For example, marriage — a creation ordinance — cannot be dissolved; but the command of love can break through this rigid, general structure as the "demand of the hour" [Gebot der Stunde]. Brunner held that God is indeed the author of the creation order, but as "law" the creation order is not the authentic will of God, which manifests itself only in the evangelical love commandment. Thus it is still the same ground motive of nature and grace which brought division even within the camp of dialectical theology. In Barthianism it led to such a rigorous dualism that the scriptural ground motive, the dynamic power of the christian life in this world, was cut off at its root. Christian scholarship, christian political life, christian art, christian social action — Barth, and to a lesser degree Brunner, considered them impossible. In their eyes, such efforts compromise the very name of Christ and express the synthesis scheme of Rome which proceeds from a hierarchic continuity between nature and grace.
In its religious root dialectical theology persistently demonstrates the inherent dialectic of the roman catholic ground motive in a modern way. The nature motive of dialectical theology embraces the humanist view of reality which immediately is brought into "crisis" because it expresses man's "sinful nature." The "Word of God," wholly unilaterally, lashes into this "self-determining nature" like a lightning flash, bringing all of life, including so-called "christian culture," into a crisis under the divine judgment. Barth acknowledged absolutely no connection between natural life as man knows it and creation. For him natural life must be viewed exclusively in terms of the fall. Although Brunner admitted that a connection exists between them, he too depreciated creation. Without a doubt, an unmistakable gnostic tendency asserted itself in dialectical theology. Dialectical theology drove a wedge into the ground motive of scripture, dividing creation and redemption and separating God's will as the creator from God's will as the redeemer.
Since dialectical theology incorporated both the roman catholic and the modern humanistic ground motives (the second within the framework of the first), it is necessary that we explore in detail the humanistic ground motive of nature and freedom. We will trace the dialectical development of the modern ground motive from its inception to the present day. In this way we hope to provide a thorough picture of the great spiritual movement of humanism. (Herman Dooyeweerd)